Language	Impairment	and	Legal	Literacy:	Is	a	Degree	of Perfectionism	Unavoidable? Cristian	Timmermann cristian.timmermann@gmail.com This	is	a	"pre-print"	accepted	manuscript,	which	has	been	published	in: "AJOB	Neuroscience" This	version	is	distributed	under	the	Creative	Commons	Attribution	3.0	Netherlands License,	which	permits	unrestricted	use,	distribution,	and	reproduction,	in	any	medium, provided	the	original	work	is	properly	cited. Please	cite	this	publication	as	follows: Timmermann,	Cristian	(2017),	Language	Impairment	and	Legal	Literacy:	Is	a	Degree of	Perfectionism	Unavoidable?	AJOB	Neuroscience	8(1):	43-45 The	final	publication	is	available	at	Taylor	&	Francis	via: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2017.1285829 Language	impairment	and	legal	literacy:	is	a	degree	of perfectionism	unavoidable? Joseph	Wszalek	(2017)	offers	a	detailed	examination	of	the	challenges	involved	in assisting	people	with	language	and	communication	impairments	in	the comprehension	of	legal	language	and	concepts	(LLC).	Yet	it	remains	unclear	what counts	as	an	ethically	unacceptable	disadvantage	in	comprehending	LLC.	As	the reader	has	most	likely	observed,	the	different	choices	regarding	profession	and leisure	activities	contribute	to	an	enormous	discrepancy	in	the	comprehension	of complex	language,	even	among	people	who	enjoyed	the	same	primary	and secondary	education.	If	we	settle	for	a	minimum	threshold	of	LLC	comprehension, we	are	likely	to	observe	that	some	people	will	not	meet	this	threshold	due	to personal	choices,	such	as	not	having	practiced	sufficiently	reading	or	having	avoided intellectually	stimulating	social	interactions.	While	as	a	society	we	might	want	to choose	to	assist	people	who	suffer	from	bad	luck,	i.e.	impairments	caused	by misfortunes,	there	is	a	wide	resistance	to	show	the	same	kind	of	support	to	assist people	who	are	in	a	position	of	disadvantage	due	to	choices	made	throughout	their lives.	As	the	ability	to	comprehend	LLC	is	crucial	to	benefit	from	protected	legal rights	and	to	do	one's	share	in	the	administration	of	justice,	the	question	of	who	will bear	the	costs	of	failure	(or	partial	failure)	to	sufficiently	develop	language	and communication	skills	becomes	central.	Due	to	space	constraints,	I	focus	in	this commentary	only	on	those	who	had	a	real	choice	in	developing	language capabilities. We	may	ponder,	are	attorneys	in	general	obliged	to	take	extra	training	on	top of	an	already	overloaded	study	program	to	assist	clients	who	have	difficulties understanding	LLC?	Do	governments	have	to	hire	a	distinct	set	of	specialists	that will	act	as	interpreters?	Wszalek	(2017)	understands	the	American	Bar Association's	Model	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct	as	suggesting	that	"competent lawyering	requires	a	reasonable	effort	to	ensure	successful	language comprehension	on	the	part	of	the	client."	While	acknowledging	the	commitment	to assist	clients	in	the	comprehension	of	LLC,	I	claim	that	making	sure	clients understand	such	language	is	not	only	an	attorney's	task,	but	that	developing	basic LLC	comprehension	skills	is	also	a	moral	obligations	of	clients	qua	citizens,	provided they	are	capable	to	do	so. Depending	on	how	a	society	understands	legal	rights,	a	moral	obligation	to undergo	continuous	democratic	education,	which	includes	an	effort	to	develop language	and	communication	skills	(Gutmann	and	Ben-Porath	2014),	can	be defended.	In	case	a	society	considers	meaningful	participation	in	the	legal	system	a normative	public	good,	here	understood	as	a	good	from	which	everyone	should benefit	and	nobody	ought	to	be	excluded,	every	citizen	would	enter	a	moral obligation	to	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	this	good.	Most	commonly,	citizens contribute	to	the	legal	system	through	taxes	to	support	its	functioning.	Yet	a responsible	citizens'	participation	in	the	administration	of	justice	also	requires	the development	of	language	and	communications	skills,	as	the	case	of	the	jury	system exemplifies	(Amaya	2008).	The	development	of	such	skills	is	also	crucial	to	maintain the	costs	of	a	legal	system	reasonable.	While	we	might	be	inclined	to	think	that people	can	make	up	for	the	individual	choice	of	not	having	developed	language comprehension	skills	by	paying	for	expensive	legal	interpreters	or	for	more	hours	of legal	counseling,	this	view	underestimates	the	extent	to	which	we	as	citizens	are embedded	in	a	legal	system	and	in	how	far	the	well-functioning	of	democracies	is dependent	on	competent	civil	participation	(cf.	Paulo	and	Bublitz	2016).	As	Wszalek (2017)	acknowledges,	meaningful	participation	in	the	legal	system	requires language	comprehension	when	waiving	rights,	entering	pleas,	making	contracts, interacting	with	law	enforcement	officials,	and	maintaining	an	effective	clientattorney	relationship,	among	others.	Timely,	it	is	also	important	to	underline	that	an understanding	of	the	content	of	the	constitution	and	human	rights	declarations helps	individual	voters	to	identify	candidates	who	disregard	these	rights.	An educated	voter	is	less	likely	to	be	manipulated	to	make	imprudent	choices	that	will harm	others	(Brennan	2011). To	involve	in	livelong	learning	to	adequately	fulfill	civil	duties	has	the	added advantage	that	citizens	will	be	more	receptive	to	new	concepts	(Deakin	Crick	and Joldersma	2007),	something	we	should	not	undervalue	in	a	dynamic	world	that continuously	faces	new	legal	challenges.	Such	an	acceptance	attitude	is	essential	in	a language	learning	process	(Ezcurdia	2004).	It	is	much	more	likely	that	an	attorney will	succeed	in	instructing	on	LLC	and	clarifying	doubts	when	the	clients	are continuously	using	and	developing	language	and	communication	skills.	Moreover, we	have	two	major	practical	problems	concerning	reliable	legal	interpretation services.	First,	it	will	be	difficult	in	practice	to	avoid	that	legal	interpreters	do	not end	up	taking	over	part	of	the	decision-making	when	people	overly	rely	on	their services	and	budgets	fall	short.	Second,	we	may	also	question	the	client's	receptive attitude	and	the	attorney's	professional	conduct	when	age,	gender,	race,	class	and anti-intellectual	prejudices	negatively	interfere	the	client-attorney	relationship. As	long	as	we	agree	as	a	society	that	meaningful	participation	in	the	legal system	is	a	normative	public	good,	and	that	therefore	every	citizens	should	make her	part	in	maintaining	this	good,	we	can	justify	the	development	of	the	necessary skill	sets	without	relying	on	perfectionism,	i.e.	the	governmental	arbitrary	favoring one	lifestyle	over	another,	in	our	case,	favoring	literacy	over	being	indifferent towards	language	abilities.	The	prevention	of	free-riding	in	safeguarding constitutional	rights	justifies	at	least	a	moral	obligation	to	continuously	work	on one's	language	and	communication	skills.	Despite	the	strong	opposition	we	can	find in	liberal	societies	to	social	policies	that	oblige	citizens	to	develop	and	use	certain skills	(Brighouse	1998),	the	challenges	Wszalek	has	identified	in	assisting	people with	language	and	communication	impairments	and	difficulties	in	legal	settings invite	us	to	reconsider	such	type	of	moral	obligations. Even	if	those	failing	to	develop	their	language	capabilities	are	a	small minority	that	will	not	affect	the	safeguarding	of	democratic	institution	and	the administration	of	justice,	the	choice	to	not	adequately	develop	those	skills	is	still	not only	a	personal	matter.	Wszalek	(2017)	notes	that	people	with	diminished	language comprehension	skills	are	overrepresented	in	the	criminal	justice	system	and	that there	could	be	a	relationship	between	language	comprehension	and	desirable	legal outcome.	There	are	good	moral	reasons	to	object	in	accepting	these	higher incarceration	rates	as	a	fair	punishment	for	the	perceived	imprudence	of	not	having developed	sufficiently	language	skills	(provided	people	had	a	reasonable	and	fair chance	to	develop	these).	Such	punishment	has	no	relation	to	the	omission	of	an action	(i.e.	developing	a	skill)	and	we	can	find	much	more	useful	ways	to	spend taxpayers'	monies	than	keeping	people	in	prison	beyond	justifiable	terms. Summarizing,	to	counter	the	social	and	natural	challenges	we	face	as	a democracy	of	increasing	complexity,	we	are	more	dependent	on	a	civil	society	that is	able	to	organize,	analyze,	debate	and	offer	solutions	using	LLC.	Putting	oneself	in	a position	in	which	one	is	obliged	to	free-ride	from	such	civil	efforts	has	to	be	morally condemned.	Before	diminishing	the	democratic	character	of	society	by	making	it	too easy	for	people	who	could	have	developed	adequate	language	skills	to	be represented	or	assisted	by	intermediaries	who	might	not	be	as	neutral	as	one	may hope,	we	should	be	more	open	to	reconsider	policies	that	insist	on	continuous democratic	education.	Yet	the	development	of	LLC	interpretation	services	continues to	remain	vital	to	include	people	with	language	and	communication	impairments. References Amaya,	Amalia.	2008.	"Justification,	coherence,	and	epistemic	responsibility	in	legal fact-finding."	Episteme	no.	5	(03):306-319. Brennan,	Jason.	2011.	"The	right	to	a	competent	electorate."	The	Philosophical Quarterly	no.	61	(245):700-724. Brighouse,	Harry.	1998.	"Civic	Education	and	Liberal	Legitimacy*."	Ethics	no.	108 (4):719-745. Deakin	Crick,	Ruth,	and	Clarence	W	Joldersma.	2007.	"Habermas,	lifelong	learning and	citizenship	education."	Studies	in	Philosophy	and	Education	no.	26	(2):7795. Ezcurdia,	Maite.	2004.	"Conocimiento	del	lenguaje	y	actitudes	de	aceptación."	Acta Poética	no.	25	(2):255-301. Gutmann,	Amy,	and	Sigal Ben-Porath.	2014.	"Democratic	education."	In	The Encyclopedia	of	Political	Thought	863–875.	New	York:	Wiley. Paulo,	Norbert,	and	Christoph	Bublitz.	2016.	Pow(d)er	to	the	People?	Voter Manipulation,	Legitimacy,	and	the	Relevance	of	Moral	Psychology	for Democratic	Theory.	Neuroethics	doi:10.1007/s12152-016-9266-7 Wszalek,	Joseph.	2017.	"Ethical	and	Legal	Concerns	Associated	with	the Comprehension	of	Legal	Language	and	Concepts."	AJOB	Neuroscience.